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THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE-A CON·

By Maurice Rosenberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 241. $6.50.

TROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION.

In one slim and readable volume Professor Maurice Rosenberg
has rendered obsolete much of the voluminous prior literature on
pretrial conferences. Previous commentators have argued that pretrials save judicial manpower; 1 they have claimed that pretrials tend
to shorten trials,2 and that settlements ari~e as a by-product of pretrials even when the conferences are not designed specifically to encourage settlements. 3 Professor Rosenberg has disproved all of these
claims, at least as to personal injury cases.
With the cooperation of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the
Columbia University Project for Effective Justice conducted a controlled experiment designed to test the effect of pretrial conferences
on personal injury cases. Professor Rosenberg directed the project;
his book is a report on the project's findings. The study deals only
with the New Jersey form of pretrial conference, which, unlike those
of many other sta~es, is not directly designed to foster settlements.
Rather, it is primarily designed to shorten the length and improve the
quality of the trial itself by such means as narrowing issues and encouraging stipulations.
Under the New Jersey rules as they existed at the time of the
study, every personal injury case was required to undergo a pretrial
conference,4 but for the purposes of the experiment a different
procedure was used. About three thousand personal injury cases
were studied. For roughly fifteen hundred cases (designated "A
cases") the mandatory pretrial procedure was continued. In the remaining fifteen hundred cases ("B C cases"), a pretrial was held
only upon request by one or more of the parties. Out of these, about
half ("C cases") had pretrials, while the other half ("B cases") had
none. The subsequent history of each case was recorded and statistically analyzed.
Strictly speaking, the ~xperiment compared a mandatory pretrial
system with a system in which a pretrial was given only if one of the
lawyers requested it. To compare both of these with a system provid-

+

1. See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMMITT.EE ON COURT CONGESTION, T.EN CURES FOR COURT
CONGESTION 11 (1959); NIMS, PRE-TRIAL 64-65 (1950).
2. See, e.g., Spangenberg & Ulrich, Pre-Trial From the Viewpoints of Two Law•
yers, 7 W. R.Es. L. REv. 418, 427 (1956); Thode, The Case for the Pre-Trial Conference
in Texas, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 372, 384 (1957).
3. See, e.g., Brennan, The Continuing Education of the Judiciary in Improved
Procedures, Seminar on Practice and Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 42, 50 (1960); Brennan,
Remar~ on Pretrial, 17 F.R.D. 479, 485 (1955).
4. N.J. Rule 4:29-l(a) (1955). As a result of the study, New Jersey changed its
rules so that pretrials in automobile negligence cases are no longer mandatory. N.J.
RULES 4:29-l(a).
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ing for no pretrials at all would require another experiment. 5 Nevertheless, Professor Rosenberg makes certain statements concerning
pretrial conferences themselves, and does not confine his discussion
to comparing a mandatory with a permissive system. He candidly
acknowledges, however, that "such statements may not command
the same level of reliability as the controlled test data." 6
Briefly summarized, the principal findings were that the mandatory system resulted in a slightly higher proportion of well-tried
cases, and that the mandatory system required more judges' time
(total pretrial and trial time) than the permissive system, to dispose
of the same number of cases. The mandatory system neither increased
settlements nor shortened trials. From these findings it was inferred
broadly that although pretrials do not save time, they do improve
trial quality. 1
Assuming that Professor Rosenberg's statistics are reliable-and
there is every reason to believe that they are-the conclusion that
the New Jersey type of pretrial conference does not save time in
personal injury cases is as unassailable as it is startling, since both
settlement rates and trial lengths are objective facts. The figures
show that pretried cases are neither settled more frequently nor tried
more expeditiously than non-pretried cases. It is theoretically possible, of course, that factors other than the existence or absence of
pretrials could account for the similar trial lengths and settlement
rates of the two groups, but this seems doubtful in view of the careful
sampling and control techniques employed.
Professor Rosenberg's other major finding-that pretrial conferences tend to improve trial quality-is not so well supported as
his finding concerning time saving. This is not to suggest that pretrials do not improve trial quality, but merely that the empirical
evidence offered by the study in support of this conclusion is weak.
One is faced at the outset with the question whether trial quality
can ever be me~sured objectively. The best way to prove that it can
would be to offer evidence tending to show that different observers
judge trial quality (or the factors which go to make up trial quality)
the same way. However, no such evidence was offered, and that omission seriously undermines this part of the project's conclusions.
Even if it is assumed that the trial quality can be measured objectively, it must still be asked whether the method used in the proj5. The test program originally designed by the project would have compared a
mandatory pretrial system with a system having no pretrials. It is possible that such
an experiment, by arbitrarily treating certain litigants differently from others, might
raise serious constitutional questions. Probably for this reason, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey modified the proposed test design so that those not mandatorily pre•
tried could request pretrials. See p. 17.
6. P. 28.
7. P. 150 n.4; see also p. 50.
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ect was wholly reliable. Trial quality was rated by lawyers and
judges who knew whether the case had been pretried; it is entirely
possible that their subjective decisions as to trial quality were influenced by their own preconceptions concerning the value of pretrials. Even if this happened in only some of the cases, the figures
tending to show that pretrials improved trial quality would be untrustworthy. It is probably impossible to arrange a large-scale experiment in which the quality of trials would be measured by observers
who did not know whether any particular case had been pretried.
Nevertheless, the fact that the evidence is the best obtainable does
not make it convincing.
Even if one is willing to accept the project's figures at face value,
still another hurdle must be overcome: do they justify the conclusion
that pretrials improve trial quality? The project's figures, gathered
from questionnaires filled out by the judges and counsel who participated in the cases, are as follows: 8
Voluntarily
Not
Prettied
B

Voluntarily
Prctried
C

All
Voluntary
Cases
(B+C)

85%
94%
91%

85%
92%
88%

81%
88%
88%

84%
90%
88%

82%
82%

73%
80%

81%
79%

77%
79%

83%

77%

66%

73%

Mandatorily
Pretried
A
Both sides well prepared
Theories clearly brought out
Issues emerged clearly
Evidence not offered on extra•
neous or undisputed issues
Cumulative evidence not offered
Evidence on essential issues
not omitted

One may agree with the author's conclusion that a mandatory
pretrial system (column A) produces a slightly better proportion of
"good" trials than a voluntary pretrial system (column B + C), but
the further conclusion that pretrials improve trial quality is at least
open to debate. A comparison of the cases voluntarily not prettied
(column B) with those voluntarily pretried (column C) seems to suggest that if a case is voluntarily given a pretrial its chance for a good
trial is lessened. Thus, as indicated in the table, a higher proportion
of the non-pretried cases than of the voluntarily pretried cases were
well prepared, brought their theories out clearly, avoided cumulative
evidence, and avoided omitting essential evidence.
The anomalous finding that non-pretried cases were better tried
than voluntarily prettied cases cannot be explained by assuming that
8. Based on Tables 1, 2, 3, and 5 at pp. 34, 35, 37, and 38.
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they were less difficult to try well. Professor Rosenberg considered
and rejected this possibility. In fact, the conclusion that pretrials did
not shorten trials is based at least in part on a rejection of this
possibility.9
The study was confined to personal injury cases "because their
volume and nature made them the largest question mark in the
pretrial picture . . . [and] in order to keep out unknown factors
that might confuse the findings or make the results ambiguous." 10
Pretrials are probably of greater value in less routine types of cases.
For example, it may be that the issues in personal injury cases usually cannot be narrowed significantly.
Like most procedural studies, this one views efficiency primarily
from the judges' viewpoint, and does not attempt to measure the
time burden which pretrials place on lawyers. Although the average
pretrial takes only twenty minutes of the judge's time, it takes far
more time for the lawyers. In addition to the time consumed in
preparing for the pretrial, untold hours are spent by lawyers warming
courtroom benches, waiting for their tum. It will not do to dismiss
these wasted man-hours as a burden which the legal profession can
well shoulder, because the burden is ultimately shifted to the public.
Defendants' lmvyers customarily charge insurance companies seventyfive dollars per pretrial; this added expense is eventually reflected in
higher insurance rates. Plaintiffs' attorneys, on the other hand,
must consider the added time and expense of a pretrial when they
fix fees, settle cases, and refuse marginal cases as too expensive to
litigate. Does the added burden which pretrials place on lawyers and
their clients tend to improve the quality of trials while reducing the
quality of justice by making it more expensive? Unfortunately, that
question was beyond the scope of the study.
Professor Rosenberg's experiment is the first and only one in
which the effect of a legal rule of procedure has been treated in a
rigorously conducted, statistically significant experiment involving
actual cases. His findings of fact are clearly separated from his interpretations of those findings; he grinds no pro- or anti-pretrial ax. The
statistical significance of each fact and figure is presented along with
the finding, and the reader is free to draw his own conclusions. For
these reasons it is indisputable that The Pretrial Conference and
Effective Justice is both an invaluable addition to the literature on
pretrial conferences and a trail-blazing venture in empirical legal
research. The book's treatment of the effect of pretrials on trial
quality shows that controlled experiments in the law are fraught with
9. P. 53; see also pp. 50, 150 n.4.
10. P. 17.

376

Michigan Law Review

difficulties and pitfalls, but its finding concerning the supposed timesaving features of pretrials demonstrates that when the pitfalls are
avoided, such experiments are well worth the effort.

Edward H. Rabin,
Assistant Professor of Law,
Rutgers-The State University

